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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
acceptances of guilty pleas. The effect of McCarthy
v. United States"0 and Boykin v. Alabama,47 more-
over, is probably to deny habeas corpus relief to
those petitioners asserting that they were coerced
at the time of pleading. This is so because com-
pliance with Rule 11 insures that the voluntariness
of the proceedings leading to a guilty plea is a
matter of record.
McMann and its progeny go a step further by
holding that allegedly coercive factors not in the
record do not entitle petitioner to habeas corpus
relief. In fact, the combination of McCarthy-Boykin
with McMann, Brady, and Parker will make it
difficult for most petitioners to obtain a hearing.
That is, relief is foreclosed on the grounds that
there was a coerced confession or the fear of a
harsher sentence. No hearing thus need be granted
to hear such claims. Furthermore, petitioners
asserting the procedural incompetence of counsel
or other coercive factors during the proceedings
will face a complete record of the voluntariness of
their plea.49 It will therefore be easy for reviewing
courts to dismiss such petitions without hearings. 51
46 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
47 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
48 FED. R. Canx. P. 11. Since the trial court, under
Rule 11, cannot accept a guilty plea without first deter-
mining that it is voluntary, it is very unlikely that a
petitioner could prevail on the assertion that he was
coerced at the time of pleading.49 See notes 10 and 48 supra.
10 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides:
Hence, the administrative efficiency of the
criminal justice system will be increased at the
expense of defendants who may have been coerced
into a plea of guilty. Notwithstanding that the
Supreme Court once held that a conviction based
on a coerced guilty plea is a violation of a defend-
ant's right to due process,5' McMann, Brady and
Parker severely limit those factors deemed coercive.
However, the constitutional rights waived in a
guilty plea are too fundamental to be sacrificed
involuntarily and unintelligently to administra-
tive efficiency. If increased efficiency is the goal,
the pre-pleading process could be improved to
insure that all guilty pleas are voluntary and in-
telligent waivers of a defendant's fifth and sixth
amendment rights as well as of his right to habeas
corpus review. In no event should those defendants
who may have been coerced into pleading guilty be
denied their right to habeas corpus review because
of the inadequate resources of the present system
of criminal justice.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show that the petitioner is en-
titled to no [habeas corpus] relief, the court shall
... grant a hearing....
Faced with a complete record of the voluntariness and
the intelligence of the petitioner's plea, it will be very
easy for the reviewing courts to dismiss petitions with-
out granting a hearing.
51 Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
JURY TRIAL
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
Under traditional rules, the game of draw poker
is played with all cards initially concealed.' In stud
poker all cards except one are shown to one's
opponent. In Williams v. Florida the Supreme
Court opted for showing one's cards to one's
opponents in the setting of the criminal adversary
system. It also permitted the fate of the game to
be constitutionally judged by a jury of six-rather
than the traditional common law jury of twelve.8
I "If a criminal trial is viewed as a draw poker game
with all cards to be held close to the chest until played,
this [a notice-of-alibi statute] can be seen as requiring
a tipping of one's hand in advance."
State ex rd. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 136, 163
N.W.2d 177, 180 (1968).
2 399 U.S. 78 (1970).9See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-92
(1930).
Johnny Williams was tried and convicted by a
six-man jury for the crime of robbery and sentenced
to life imprisonment. Williams' only defense was
alibi. 4 Under the Florida rules of criminal pro-
cedure,' the defendant is required, if the prose-
cution makes a written demand, to state whether
he intends to plead an alibi. Should the defendant
so plead, he must furnish the state with infor-
mation as to his whereabouts at the time of the
crime and a list of his alibi witnesses.
Prior to trial, Williams sought a protective order
4 "Alibi is a claim that defendant was elsewhere at
the time of the crime and therefore could not have
committed it." State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 388, 221
A.2d 199, 204, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980 (1966).
5 FLA. R. Cmu. P. 1.200.
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excepting him from the notice-of-alibi rule on the
grounds that it violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.' The motion
was denied.7 In compliance with the notice-of-alibi
rule, petitioner provided the prosecution with the
name of his principle alibi witness, Mary Scotty.
This information, enabled the prosecution to
obtain a pre-trial deposition of Mrs. Scotty, which
was subsequently used to impeach the witness'
trial testimony. Furthermore, the state's prior
knowledge of the detailed time and location of
Williams' alibi enabled the prosecution to further
impeach Mrs. Scotty's testimony by presenting
the contradictory testimony of a police officer who
recalled seeing Mrs. Scotty at the time of the crime
somewhere other than where she claimed she was.
Petitioner's constitutional attack on the alibi
statute was two pronged. First he alleged that the
statute sanctioning the right of the state to dis-
cover his alibi deprived him of due process under
the fourteenth amendment 8 Rejecting this claim,
the Court emphasized the reciprocity in discovery
which is permitted under the Florida rule. By
the terms of the Florida statute, the state is
:equired, upon receipt of defendant's list of alibi
witnesses, to "serve upon the defendant the
names and addresses ... of the witnesses the
State proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit
the defendant's alibi at the trial of the cause."
The Court apparently felt that a criminal dis-
covery statute which imposed mutual obligations
on the state and the accused did not violate the
Constitution.10 The Court also noted the rational
and, indeed, compelling policy underpinning the
notice-of-alibi statutes. As Mr. Justice White
6 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ... 1" U.S. CoNtsr. amend. V.7 Petitioner also unsuccessfully sought a pretrial
motion to impanel a twelve-man jury instead of a six-
man jury provided by Florida in all but capital cases.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §913.10(1) (1967).
8 399 U.S. at 81; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV(1) reads
in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ......
9 FLA. R. Can. P. 1.200.10 See. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372
P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962) (Traynor, J.), which
permitted the state discovery of defendant's witnesses
and x-rays which were to support his defense of im-
potence to a charge of rape. judge Traynor pointed
out that criminal discovery should not be a "one-way
street." See also Louisell, Crininal Discovery and Self-
Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts te Dilemma,
53 CAm. L. Rxv. 89, 91 (1965); Comment, Tiw Sdf-
Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to Criminal Discovery?,
51 CAraI. L. REv. 135 (1963); cf. Norton, Discovery in
the Criminal Process, 61 J. Cm. L. C. & P.S. 11 (1970).
stated, speaking for the Court, "[g]iven the ease
with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's
interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-
hour defense is both obvious and legitimate." 11
Since 1927, numerous statesi have enacted notice-
of-alibi statutes8 similar to Florida's as a means
to deter defendants from using manufactured
alibis as a last minute, surprise defense. 4 Such
statutes have been uniformly upheld in state
courts. 15
Second, petitioner argued that the notice-of-
alibi rule was unconstitutional because it violated
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. 0 It is hardly questionable that the state's
pretrial deposition of Mrs. Scotty, which was
obtained because the defendant had complied with
the Florida rule, quite possibly vitiated Williams'
alibi defense and thereby indirectly incriminated
him. The traditional rationale courts have em-
ployed to uphold the constitutionality of alibi
statutes is couched in a literal interpretation of
the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, and rests on the notion that,
11399 U.S. at 81; See also State v. Martin, 2 Ariz.
App. 510, 514-15, 410 P.2d 132, 136-37 (1966); State
v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 1193-94, 119 N.W.2d 210,
217 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 853 (1963); State v.
Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 388, 221 A.2d 199, 204 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980 (1966); People v. Schade, 161
Misc. 212, 216, 292 N.Y.S. 612, 617 (1936); State v.
Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 4, 176 N.E. 656, 657 (1931).2 Ams. R. Cm. P. 192(B); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§114-14 (1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§9-1631-9-1633
(1956); IOWA CODE ANNt. §777-18 (1962); KA. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §62-1341 (1964); Micr. STAT. ANN. ch. 28,§1043 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §630.14 (1947); N.J.
R. Cm. P. 3: 5-9 (1958); N.Y. ConE Cum. PRoc.
§295-L (McKinney 1958); Omao Rv. CODE AN.
§2945.58 (Page 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, §585
(1969); PA. R. Can. PaAc. 312 (Supp. 1970); S.D.
Con'. LAWS §23-37-5 (1969); UrTA CODE ANN. §77-
22-17 (1953), Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§6561-6562
(1959), Wis. STAT. ANN. §955.07 (West 1958). See
also 399 U.S. at 82 n. 11.
13 See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 480-81 (1953).
14 One empirical study indicates such statutes to be
most effective in preventing fraudulent alibies. See
Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. Can. L.C. &
P.S. 29 (1964).
S15Rider v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966);
State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 119 N.W.2d 210, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 853 (1963), State v. Rider, 194 Kan.
398, 399 P.2d 564 (1965); State v. Angeleri, 51 N.J.
382, 241 A.2d 3 (1968); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379,
221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980 (1966); People
v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212,292 N.Y.S. 612 (1936); People
v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1940);
Commonwealth v. Vecchiolli, 208 Pa. Super. 483, 224
A.2d 96 (1966); State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.
2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968).
16In Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964), the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was




under the terms of the statute, no testimony is
actually compelled 7 Whether the defendant plans
to defend on the basis of alibi is wholly a matter
of the defendant's unfettered choice.' The de-
fendant always retains the option of abandoning
his alibi defense at trial.19 The only real compulsion
involved in complying with a notice-of-alibi rule
relates to the time at which the defendant must
reveal his defense. As the Court in Williams cor-
rectly pointed out:
At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to
accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing
him to divulge at an earlier date information
which the petitioner from the beginning planned
to divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege entities a defendant as a matter
of constitutional right to await the end of the
State's case before announcing the nature of his
defense, any more than it entities him to await
the jury's verdict on the State's case-in-chief
before deciding whether or not to take the stand
himself.'
Moreover, even if the defendant were not required
to give pretrial notice of his alibi, there is nothing
to prohibit the state from seeking a continuance
for purposes of investigation should the defendant
proffer a last minute alibi.2' Therefore, the notice-
of-alibi rule in no way bestows any advantage on
the state which it does not already possess via
other, albeit indirect, means.
Another literalistic argument in support of the
alibi rule's constitutionality resides in the very
basic question whether giving notice of alibi is in
fact incriminating. In upholding a similar New
York notice-of-alibi statute,2 the court in People
v. Schadel stated the obvious: notice-of-alibi
statutes seek out information which exonerates
defendants rather than incriminating them.
2
'
Concurring with Schade, Mr. Chief Justice Burger
17 See State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 119 N.W.2d
210, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 853 (1963); State v. Angeleri,
51 NJ. 382, 241 A.2d 3 (1968); People v. Rakiec, 260
App. Div. 452, 23 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1940); State ex rd.
Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968).
18 399 U.S. at 84-85.
29 It has been held impermissible for the state to
comment on the defendant's compliance with statute
when at trial he elects not to use the defense. State v.
Cocco, 73 Ohio App. 182, 55 N.E.2d 430 (1943). But
see 399 U.S. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
20 399 U.S. at 85.
21 "Id.
22 N.Y. CODE Cans. PRoC. §295-1 (McKinney 1958).
23161 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y.S. 612 (1936).
24 Id. at 615. Cf. State ex rd. Simos v. Burke, 41
Wis.2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968).
in Williams emphasized how pretrial discovery of
alibi can work to the advantage of the accused.'
8
He reasoned that if the state found the accused's
alibi to be sound on the basis of pretrial investi-
gation, a needless trial could be avoided
26 In
essence, the notice-of-alibi rule would only jeop-
ardize a defendant whose alibi is manufactured.21
A more fundamental issue was at stake in
Williams, however. Over and above the literal
interpretation of the fifth amendment's appli-
cation to the notice-of-alibi rule, the Court's
decision reflected a judicial disposition between
two competing policies: that of the government's
discovery of fraudulent testimony versus that of
the defendant's right under the fifth amendment
to remain silent.'2 The Court uniquely illustrated
the tension between these two policies by com-
paring the adversary system to a poker game.
29
In holding that the defendant may be compelled to
reveal his alibi prior to trial, the Court found that
the adversary system need not be like the game of
draw poker in which all cards are concealed. The
Court held that the exigent concern of the state
for discovery of bogus alibis is paramount to any
tactical trial advantage which the accused might
gain from use of a surprise alibi defense."
0 States,
therefore, may constitutionally require the de-
fendant to "tip his hand." "
The Williams case, however, will probably be
more remembered for its holding that a six man
jury could constitutionally convict a man to life
in prison than for its discussion of alibis. The
25399 U.S. at 105-06.
26 Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CRM. L.C.
& P.S. 29, 32 (1964).
2"Certain it is that no innocent person can in any
manner be injured by this statute." People v. Schade,
161 Misc. 212, 218, 292 N.Y.S. 612, 617 (1936). See
also State ex rd. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 137-38,
163 N.W.2d 177, 181 (1968).
28See Comment, 51 CATI. L. Rxv. 131, 136-38
(1963). Cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1945).
29 399 U.S. at 82; see note 1 supra and accompanying
text.
10 State ex re. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 163
N.W.2d 177 (1968); Louisell, Criminal Discovery and
Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts the Di-
lemma, 53 CAnm'. L. Rlv. 89, 91 (1953).1 But see 399 U.S. at 106 (Black, J. and Douglas,
J., dissenting). Both Justices Black and Douglas vigor-
ously dissented from the majority holding on the fifth
amendment issue labeling it "a most dangerous de-
parture from the Constitution and the traditional safe-
guards afforded persons accused of a crime." Id. at
116. Implicit in Black's dissent was his traditional
disdain for the Court's balancing an accused's con-
stitutional rights against the interest of the state. See




petitioner argued that on the basis of Duncan v.
Louisiana 2 a jury of less than twelve violated his
sixth amendment guaranty to jury trial. Although
the sixth amendment does not mention the number
which shall comprise a jury, nevertheless Williams'
challenge was not without substantial precedent.,,
Seventy-two years ago the Supreme Court stated
unequivocally, "[t]he supreme law of the land
required that [defendant] should be tried by a jury
composed of not less than twelve persons." 4 Al-
though this excerpt from Thompson v. Utah is only
dicta,31 it does reflect the basic historical supposi-
tion of American jurisprudence that the constitu-
tional jury embraces twelve men.38 Two years later
in Maxwell v. Douvr the high Court again reasserted
the same principle "that a jury composed, as at
common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the
Sixth Amendment." ,
In Patton v. United Statesss the issue before the
Court was whether a defendant might constitu-
tionally waive his right to a jury of twelve for a
lesser number. Although the Court in that case
held that, under the circumstances, waiver of a
twelve-man jury was permissible, the Court
insisted "that a constitutional jury means twelve
men as though that number had been specifically
named.. . ."4 Relying on these cases, as well as
the mandate in Duncan v. Louisiana"-that the
fourteenth amendment grants to the defendant
in state criminal action a trial by jury as though he
were tried in a federal court-petitioner claimed
his constitutional right to be heard by a jury of
twelve under federal law!2
82 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Held: the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees a right to trial by jury in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-
would come within the sixth amendment guaranty.)
3 See authorities cited at 47 Am. Ju2d Jury §124,
at 726 n. 5 (1969).84Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
11 In Thompson the defendant had been convicted by
a twelve-man jury for a crime committed in the Terri-
tory of Utah. After Utah was admitted to the Union,
Thompson was granted a new trial. Pursuant to the
new state constitution, defendant was tried by eight
men. The Court held this change in number as an ex
postfacto law as applied to the defendant.
36See Capital Traction Company v. Hof, 174 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1899).
176 U.S. 581 (1900) overruled in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
IId. at 586.
29 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
10 Id. at 292.
41391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).42 FEn. R. Cmn. P. 23(b) provides:
Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before
verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with
Breaking from adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court found that a trial by a
six-man jury was not unconstitutional. 43 In doing
so, the Court noted that juries of less than twelve
are sanctioned by numerous state statutes" as
well as by courts.45 The obvious purposes under-
lying such statutes are judicial efficiency and
economic expediency.4 To justify its rift from
long established precedent, the Court took refuge
in the history surrounding the evolution of the
jury trial." Although the Court conceded that the
early common law, as well as its own decisions,
recognized a jury to be comprised of twelve,48 it
found no reason beyond "historical accident" 49
why the number twelve should be constitutionally
sacrosanct.
The Court's apparent disregard for the venerable
traditions embedding the twelve-man jury within
our jurisprudence is disturbing. From a legal
standpoint, the rule of stare decisis commits the
law to consistency. In juxtaposing deviation from
precedent to affirmation of it, the law can justify
the former only by demonstrating a pressing social
need for reform or an injustice resulting from the
application of the old rule. It is debatable whether
the common law jury of twelve can be condemned
under either of the above characteristics. From a
strictly empirical standpoint, one thing is certain
about the twelve-man jury. It works. As Mr.
jnstice Harlan concluded in his dissent: "The
decision in Williams ... casts aside workability
and relevance and substitutes uncertainty." 50
the approval of the court that the jury shall con-
sist of any number less than 12.
See 399 U.S. at 127 n. 13 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 CoLm. L.
REv. 419, 430 (1969), wherein the commentator raises
the issue raised in the instant case. Does the Duncan de-
cision require the states to afford the accused a trial
by a jury of twelve pursuant to federal law?
4399 U.S. at 86. But see also Id. at 127-28 (Harlan,J., dissenting); Id. at 116-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"For a compilation, see Note, Trial by Jury in
Criminal Cases, 69 CoLum. L. Rxv. 419, 430 n. 75(1969).45E.g., State v. Perrilla, 144 Conn. 228, 129 A.2d
226 (1957); Heams v. State, 223 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1969);
State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 162 S.E.2d 535 (1968).
"State ex rd. Sauk County District Attorney v.
Gollmar, 32 Wis.2d 406, 412-13, 145 N.W.2d 670, 673(1966).
4See Duncan -v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Huav. L.
R.Ev. 917 (1926); White, Origin and Development of
Trial by Jury, 29 TEmN. L. REv. 8 (1961).
4" 399 U.S. at 86-99.
"4I d. at 89.
60 399 U.S. at 129.
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